Party-Agent Campaigns vs. Candidate-Centered Campaigns

Candidates in presidential elections, to many, seem like agents of their parties. Hand picked from the "smoke-filled rooms" full of scotch snifters, cigars, and six-foot fireplaces, an elite "chosen one" emerges to carry the flag of the party. Prior to the 2008 primary season, one candidate emerged quickly as the frontrunner: the immediate assumed president-to-be Hillary Clinton. Thought to be the next President of the United States, Clinton began her campaign with a sense of entitlement. But where did this (media branded) sense of entitlement come from? Not merely from being a former First Lady, as many have been before her. Nor was it from being a Senator, as no Senator since John Kennedy had won the office. It was a combination of fundraising power, favorable polling, and an entire career built upon networking due to her husband having been president himself. To much of the electorate, Hillary Clinton was seen as the ultimate "smoke-filled room" candidate.

But how did the candidates of 2008 break away from the "party-agent" image? Simply said, some candidates were not such. Barack Obama, for example, ran a candidate-centered campaign. He engaged the electorate, and utilized netroots to amass a coalition of supporters across the country. Barack Obama was never constrained by the netroots, but rather expanded his base of support, breaking away from the need to be (or have been) and party agent. As Howard Dean did in 2004, Barack Obama did in 2008. The swelling attention via the internet and quick support from select media outlets gave him the strength to break past the party candidacy of Hillary Clinton, as Howard Dean nearly did to John Kerry.

For the sake of argument and conciseness, the examples will be chiefly drawn from that of the Democratic candidates, although the same arguments can be applied to the Republican candidates as well (although it is murky as to who the "party candidate" for the GOP actually was). Tension existed between the candidate-centered and party-centric campaigns of Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. From the beginning, the Clintons had put in place a political machine, capable of implementing the campaign infrastructure and funding needed to sweep through a primary battle. Her message was cleverly crafted, choreographed, and coordinated. But even such planning was not enough for the flexibility of a candidate centered campaign such as that of Barack Obama. With a clean slate, his message was able to resinate throughout the electorate, and he was able to win the critical contest of Iowa. This was a hard blow to the party elite, who even six months prior, would never had predicted such an upset after having worked for years to organize the fundraising and endorsements thought necessary.

Indeed, the balance between these two types of candidates had been affected by recent technological innovations and advances in communication. The political powerhouse of the Clintons (and I do say "the Clintons" due to Hillary never having been her own candidate, but rather an agent of her party and the former president) could not compete with the massive fundraising takes of the Obama campaign. His ability to raise funds (breaking records month after month) and ability to network his supports into meeting places put the Clinton campaign at a huge disadvantage (although Clinton was still able to raise money online and gather supporters, but never to the extent of Obama). Hillary Clinton was forced to lend her own campaign millions of her own dollars in a month when Obama has raised over $40 million from individual donors online. His supporters were able to form one of the largest grassroots campaigns in political history. All thanks to the advancements in technology and communication. The balance of power between than of a candidate-centered candidate and the party candidate has shifted. Not to say it has not since the nomination debacle of 1968, but the age of the party candidate being a sure shot is coming to a close due to "the forces of mass democracy."

Congressional candidates, however, face a similar yet different situation with respect to vulnerability posed by the internet. Like their presidential candidate counterparts, Congressional candidates utilize the internet to deliver their message, post free information and websites, and upload videos of commercials and debates. But theses candidates face a more focused opposition, and a smaller constituency. Although they have stronger odds of being incumbents (which adds a heavy advantage) they still face the same challenges of needing to raise funds quickly and have proper outlets for transmitting their messages. Any candidate at any level of office is vulnerable from gaffs and a video turning viral, but the internet is more of a benefit than a hazard.

Turning to Teachout (2006), and attempting to assess whether any of the recommendations made were applied to 2008 candidates' websites, it is evident that such tools have been implemented. Although the three major 2008 presidential candidates' websites are now inactive, candidates that currently serve in Congress employ these ideas. One such example is the independent (from the Senate website) organization for United States Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI):   www.russfeingold.org   Employing meet up information, email sign up, blogging references, links to contribute and volunteer, photos and videos, and visitor feedback allow Senator Feingold to gather a broad base of support through digital media and technological advancements that were not readily available even ten years ago. Now, with the power to reach his supporters with a simple mass email, Senator Feingold already has an advantage over any future opponent for the Senate seat, let alone his power of incumbency.